The first photos and basic details of the UAV were disclosed by military intelligence last week. The drone resembles the Iranian Karrar, most of its modules are identical to those used in other Alabuga-produced Gerans, and the enemy is considering launching the drone from a Su-25 attack aircraft.

Now, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has published a detailed analysis of the new Russian strike UAV Geran-5 on the War&Sanctions portal, including an interactive 3D model, components, electronic component base, and key tactical and technical characteristics.

Key characteristics of Geran-5:

  • maximum takeoff weight — 850 kg

  • cruising speed — 450–600 km/h, significantly exceeding Geran-3

  • flight endurance — about 2 hours

  • estimated range — up to 950 km

  • maximum altitude — 6 km (actual recorded use — from 200 m to 3 km)

The UAV uses a Chinese TELEFLY TF-TJ2000A turbojet engine with 200 kgf thrust (1,960 newtons).

The drone features components similar to other Gerans: FCU flight controller, SADRA/MINSOO inertial navigation system, Kometa-M12 satellite navigation system with a 12-element CRP antenna, Tracker V3 telemetry transmission system based on a Raspberry microcomputer and 3G/LTE modems, Xingkai Tech XK-F358 MESH modem, and others.

The fuselage skin, wings, and tail assembly are made of carbon fiber; the load-bearing structure is made of aluminum profiles and steel.

For marking, the enemy uses an experimental “E” series identical to that applied to Geran-2 modifications with R-60 missiles and MANPADS.

Identified electronic components originate from three countries — China, the United States, and Germany. A full list of components, markings, and photos is available via the provided link.

The Main Intelligence Directorate also published data on 105 additional foreign-made electronic components identified in Russian Geran-2 UAVs, Zala T-20 drones, and the Kh-32 air-to-surface cruise missile.

The expansion of Russia’s range of weapons based on Iranian prototypes and continued use of components from manufacturers in free-world countries underscore the need to intensify efforts to block aggressor states’ access to technology.