The incident highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s air-defense systems at critically important facilities and simultaneously showcased the capabilities of Ukrainian unmanned…
The current Russian–Ukrainian war has sparked a real revolution in military affairs, prompting a reassessment of “old” types of weaponry and traditional methods of conducting combat operations.
The classical armored offensive operation — in the form in which it has been viewed since the Second World War — no longer guarantees success.
The battlefields in Ukraine, saturated with drones, EW systems, ATGMs and minefields, have shown armies around the world the vulnerability of the familiar concept of a “tank breakthrough”.
Do tanks have a future? We asked this question to a renowned researcher of military history and weaponry, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Humanities of the National Army Academy named after Hetman Petro Sahaidachny — Andriy Kharuk.
— So, Andriy Ivanovych, is there a future for the use of armored vehicles on the battlefield, at least in the near term?
— This question arises with full urgency, and the answers are polar — from “it’s time to scrap tanks” to “tanks will still prove themselves!” The latter view is advocated by military analyst Gerald McWilliams of the University of Nebraska, Omaha, USA, in his article — more precisely, a preprint — published in September. It seemed quite interesting to me, so let’s break it down for the readers of your agency.
The material is structured as theses, so let us examine them step by step.
Traditional offensive operations by armored formations have become too costly, too risky, and insufficiently effective.
In a situation where reconnaissance UAVs hover over every elevation and artillery is adjusted in real time, the concealed concentration and maneuvering of armored vehicles becomes almost impossible.
But, as the author notes, it is too early to speak of the “death of mobility and armor.”
What we are dealing with is not the end of the tank era, but the need for their technological and organizational transformation.
— And what does this transformation entail?
— McWilliams identifies the tasks that, if not fulfilled, will render armored forces irrelevant in future conflicts:
1.Suppressing enemy artillery.
This relates to the idea of drones displacing artillery.
The main threat to armored vehicles is not ATGMs but precision artillery guided by drones. According to the author, the response time of counter-battery systems must be reduced from 7–12 minutes to one minute.
In addition to counter-battery warfare, proactive strike/hunter drone units, organically integrated into the fire-support function, must thoroughly detect and suppress or destroy concealed enemy artillery positions in advance — before any armored offensive begins.
This is possible only with full integration of reconnaissance UAVs and automated target-designation systems.
2. Reducing the mine threat.
Minefields remain one of the most reliable barriers in the path of armored vehicles. McWilliams believes that the success of an assault now depends on how quickly lanes are cleared.
This can be achieved largely through a combination of ground-penetrating radars and autonomous demining vehicles. Redundancy at the unit level matters: mine plows and demining vehicles must be mass-produced rather than regarded as niche assets.
Drone systems with AI-based image recognition can also help detect likely mined areas along the route in advance.
3. Countering drones.
Drones have become “tank killers”. According to the study, more than 70 percent of armored losses on the Russian–Ukrainian front come from UAV strikes. Yet the author still puts artillery suppression as the top priority…
— And what solutions — or rather, countermeasures — does the author propose?
— The answer is a layered counter-drone system, both at the individual vehicle level and at the formation level.
At the vehicle level, such measures are advisable: active protection, passive armor enhancements, electronic warfare jammers, and a network of inexpensive sensors creating a “surveillance web” around the vehicle.
Integrated into one system, these sensors should detect threats along the convoy’s approach routes.
Beyond the vehicle level, the concept of this “surveillance network” must extend across the front and be deployed in advance, before any armored movement.
This network should consist of inexpensive sensors but with adequate resolution (low-power radars, affordable networked video sensors, and acoustic detectors).
Ideally, such a surveillance network should cover at least the expected width and depth of any armored offensive.
This concept provides a high probability of detecting enemy drones and, importantly, gives time to react and deploy countermeasures.
4. A new type of air support.
Manned aircraft increasingly come under fire from modern air-defense systems.
McWilliams proposes replacing them with escort drones operating in support of each tank company. These drones perform route reconnaissance, provide fire cover and adjustment — becoming the “eyes” of armored vehicles.
5. Hunting ATGM crews.
Experience shows that for every destroyed tank, an average of two ATGM launches occur. Therefore, the attacking side’s main task is to enter the enemy’s decision-making cycle.
McWilliams proposes using miniature reconnaissance drones and 360-degree sensors that give crews full situational awareness even with hatches closed.
6. Neutralizing aerial threats.
Without air control, any armored operation is doomed.
It is necessary to strike enemy airfields, depots, and command posts in advance — combining strike UAVs and mobile air-defense systems to secure at least temporary local air superiority.
According to calculations, even a 30-minute window without enemy aviation more than doubles the chances of a breakthrough.
7. Ground robotic systems (UGVs).
According to the author, UGVs should become the “first echelon” of the offensive. They can conduct reconnaissance, check routes for mines, serve as bait for anti-tank weapons, and support the attack with fire.
A ratio of “one UGV for every two manned vehicles” reduces crew losses by a quarter.
8. New artillery.
The artillery of the future is not a tool for prolonged fire but a precise instrument for sustaining tempo.
It must operate on the “shoot and scoot” principle, rely on UAV and sensor-network data, and act in short but ultra-precise bursts.
Transitioning 60 percent of guns to precision ammunition, according to the author, increases fire effectiveness to 80 percent while halving shell expenditure.
— So what general conclusion can be drawn from this study?
— The key finding is that reaction time becomes decisive. The one who identifies, classifies, and destroys a target faster wins the battle.
Everything else is derivative: drones, sensor networks, AI, integrated command systems.
Armored forces must transition from the linear principle of massed armor to the network-centric principle — where tanks, UAVs, artillery, and EW systems form a single digital “kill chain”.
Without this, armor loses its purpose: even the strongest vehicle is powerless if it cannot see the enemy or is not connected to the intelligence network.
For the defense industry, this means profound changes.
Producers of armored vehicles will have to create platforms with open architecture, ready for integration with drones and EW systems.
Artillery suppliers — to transition to precision munitions and digital fire control.
Software developers — to ensure the interaction of dozens of platforms within a single information environment.
In terms of exports, this opens new niches: mobile counter-drone systems, UGVs, intelligent guidance systems, and service contracts for network integration of weapons.
In other words, in the 21st century, the competitiveness of armored exports is determined not by armor thickness but by the depth of digital integration.
The future of armored operations lies not in abandoning tanks but in rethinking them as elements of a unified system of reconnaissance, fire, and maneuver.
The tank remains a symbol of offensive power, but its strength now depends not so much on its gun and armor as on its ability to be part of network-centric warfare.
In this war, the winner is not the one with more steel but the one with faster information.
And finally, I will add this.
McWilliams confirms my favorite thesis: tanks do not fight — structures fight. Conceptually, nothing new — this idea was known as far back as the Second World War. Only the components of these structures change…
