Ukrainian drones are increasingly reaching Russian targets thousands of kilometers from the border.

Against this backdrop, sociologists are recording fluctuations in public trust in Vladimir Putin, while Russians are increasingly talking about fears of mobilization and a desire for negotiations. Is the war beginning to return to Russian society not only in the form of news reports, but also through everyday problems?

For years, Russian propaganda has constructed a convenient picture of the war for its domestic audience: hostilities are taking place somewhere far away, the Russian army supposedly has the situation under control, and life inside the country should remain unchanged. Ukrainian strikes on military, oil-refining, and other strategic facilities are gradually dismantling this information construct.

The consequences of the war are now becoming visible far beyond the front line. Fires at industrial facilities, fuel shortages, the threat of mobilization, restrictions on ordinary communications, and the need to strengthen air defenses are forcing Russians to view what the Kremlin calls the “special military operation” differently.

One telling signal emerged on November 13, 2026, when the results of a poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) were released. According to the findings, trust in Vladimir Putin fell by 2.4 percentage points in one week, from 77.5% to 75.1%.

This was the largest weekly decline since mid-August. At the same time, approval of Putin’s performance as president fell by just 0.2 percentage points, to 71.4%.

At first glance, these figures do not indicate a large-scale political crisis. However, when considered alongside other sociological studies, economic indicators, and the mood of the Russian population, more interesting trends begin to emerge.

Putin’s approval ratings: what the figures conceal

To understand the situation, it is important not to confuse two indicators: trust in a politician and approval of their performance. These are different questions, and the answers do not necessarily change in tandem.

A person may distrust certain presidential decisions while continuing to approve of their remaining in power. Conversely, someone may express trust in a politician while being dissatisfied with the specific consequences of their governance.

That is why a weekly 2.4-percentage-point decline in trust in Putin cannot automatically be interpreted as an equivalent decline in his political support.

However, what is interesting is that this is not the first similar episode in recent months.

In mid-August, VCIOM had already recorded a 2.5-percentage-point decline in trust in the Russian president, bringing the figure down to 70.8%. That period also coincided with intensive Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries and other facilities.

In September, according to data cited by OBOZ.UA, approval of Putin’s performance fell by another 2.1 percentage points over the course of a week, to 68%.

There is, however, an important detail: following the August decline, the figures subsequently recovered in part. Therefore, the current trend should also be viewed not as an irreversible collapse, but as a possible indication of instability in public sentiment.

Notably, the independent Russian Levada Center recorded 77% approval of Putin’s performance in October 2026. This was 10 percentage points lower than in September 2025, when the figure stood at 87%.

In other words, according to the Levada Center’s research, the president’s approval rating lost a significant portion of its previous gains over the course of a year, although it remains high.

It is important to bear in mind that VCIOM and the Levada Center use different methodologies, and their figures cannot be directly compared as if they were results from the same poll. Nevertheless, both sets of data make it possible to track long-term trends.

Russia’s rear areas no longer appear untouchable

One reason Ukrainian long-range strikes matter far beyond their immediate military impact is their effect on the Russian economy and everyday life.

This applies primarily to the oil-refining industry, one of the key components of Russia’s financial and logistical system.

According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA), crude oil processing at Russian refineries fell to 3.8 million barrels per day in June 2026. This was the lowest level in more than 20 years and approximately 30% below the figure recorded a year earlier.

According to the agency’s estimates, gasoline production declined by 20% compared with 2025, while diesel fuel production fell by almost 30%. To protect the domestic market, the Russian authorities were forced to restrict fuel exports.

But the situation did not stop there.

On November 10, Reuters published a report citing two industry sources, according to which a new wave of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries since late October had reduced available oil-refining capacity by approximately 30%.

According to the agency’s sources, attacks over the course of a single week disrupted operations or caused emergency shutdowns at nine of Russia’s 35 largest oil refineries.

The combined nominal capacity of the facilities whose operations were disrupted by strikes since late October amounted to approximately 300,000 tonnes per day. Reuters sources estimated the actual reduction in oil processing at up to 200,000 tonnes per day.

The affected facilities included refineries in Ryazan, Yaroslavl, and the Volga region. Separately, the agency reported a fire at the Kirishi oil refinery, one of the largest in Russia.

It is important to understand how this impact works. Damage to an oil refinery does not simply mean destroyed equipment or a temporary production shutdown. It disrupts the fuel supply chain, places additional pressure on other refineries, generates repair costs, creates logistical problems, and necessitates the redistribution of resources.

For ordinary Russians, the war in such circumstances ceases to be merely a television image. It can manifest itself in fuel prices, availability, transportation costs, and other economic consequences.

And this is precisely where the military impact of Ukrainian strikes begins to intersect with the social one.

What Russians are actually noticing: telling poll results

A study conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) is particularly interesting.

In a poll conducted on November 6–8, 2026, respondents were asked which events of the previous week had made the strongest impression on them.

Seven percent mentioned attacks on Russian territory.

In particular, respondents referred to drone attacks on St. Petersburg and Omsk, as well as strikes in the Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, and Oryol regions.

At first glance, seven percent may not seem like much. But the significance of this figure lies not only in its size.

People independently named the events that had made the strongest impression on them. In other words, attacks on Russian territory made it onto the list of events that remained part of the information landscape and everyday awareness of a segment of the population.

This matters because the Kremlin has spent years trying to control how the war is perceived inside the country: minimizing inconvenient reports, portraying strikes on Russian territory as minor incidents, and preventing a widespread sense of a large-scale threat from taking hold.

However, FOM’s findings do not prove that Ukrainian strikes were the direct cause of the decline in trust in Putin. These are different sociological indicators obtained through different questions. Nevertheless, examining them together makes it possible to see that attacks on Russian territory have already become part of the public agenda.

The paradox of Russian society: people support the war but no longer want to fight it

An even more revealing picture emerges from a Levada Center study published on November 3, based on an October poll.

According to the findings, 69% of Russians said they supported the actions of Russian military personnel in Ukraine. At the same time, 65% of respondents favored a transition to peace negotiations, while only 26% supported the continuation of military operations.

This is one of the most telling contradictions in Russian public sentiment.

Support for the army and a desire to end the war are not mutually exclusive positions. A person can approve of their country’s actions while not wanting further escalation, mobilization, or personal financial losses.

In effect, a significant proportion of Russians appear to want the outcome of the war without having to pay an increasingly high personal price for it.

This conclusion is further supported by another Levada Center poll released on November 5.

According to its findings, 57% of Russians fear that a general mobilization will be declared because of the war against Ukraine. Over the course of a year, this figure increased by six percentage points, and compared with February 2024, it rose by 23 percentage points.

At the same time, 72% of respondents believe there is no need to announce a second wave of mobilization in the coming months. Only 9% consider it necessary.

Thus, Russian society demonstrates a rather contradictory position: people are considerably more willing to support the war in general terms than to accept its direct consequences for their families, jobs, and personal safety.

This does not mean that Russians have become mass opponents of the aggression. But it does indicate the existence of a threshold beyond which abstract support for the war may clash with a personal unwillingness to bear its cost.

Why it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to maintain the illusion of normal life

An authoritarian system can maintain high levels of government approval for years through propaganda, control over the information space, and restrictions on political competition.

However, there are factors that are much harder to neutralize through information control.

A fire at an oil refinery cannot be undone by a television report. Fuel shortages do not disappear because of statements about military successes. Fear of mobilization does not necessarily vanish after another presidential address.

It is particularly important that the consequences of the war are distributed unevenly. Residents of border regions, major industrial centers, areas near military facilities, and people whose work depends on fuel and logistics may feel these consequences far more acutely than residents of other regions.

This creates different perceptions of the war within a single country.

For some, it remains a television story about victories. For others, it means air-raid alerts, explosions, fires, disruptions to industrial operations, and uncertainty about the future.

Information isolation is another contributing factor. According to October data from the Levada Center, approval of Putin’s performance stood at 84% among those who get their information from television, while 41% of those who use YouTube channels as an information source disapproved of his performance.

The difference between these groups demonstrates how strongly the information environment influences perceptions of the political situation.

At the same time, this does not prove that television alone creates support for Putin: the audiences also differ in terms of age, views, and other characteristics. Nevertheless, the gap is indicative of the information polarization within Russian society.

Can Ukrainian strikes change Russians’ attitudes toward the war?

The answer is not as straightforward as it might seem following reports of a decline in Putin’s approval ratings.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian strategic facilities do not automatically guarantee an increase in anti-war sentiment. Even while recognizing the economic losses and the danger on their own territory, some Russians may continue to support the aggression.

Moreover, propaganda can use these attacks to rally society around the image of an external enemy. The Kremlin can portray them as proof that the war must continue rather than as a consequence of its own aggression against Ukraine.

Therefore, the main impact of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign should not be assessed on the basis of a single sociological indicator.

There are several interconnected areas of impact:

  • Military: Disrupting the operations of facilities that supply the Russian army with fuel and other resources.
  • Economic: Reducing oil processing, generating repair costs, restructuring logistics, and placing additional pressure on the state budget.
  • Social: Spreading a sense of insecurity, increasing concerns about mobilization, and disrupting the accustomed way of life.
  • Political: Gradually accumulating dissatisfaction with government decisions that make the war increasingly tangible for the population.

It is precisely the combined effect of these factors that may have long-term significance.

What the OSINT analysis reveals: not a collapse in approval ratings, but an accumulation of problems

When the data released over the past several weeks by VCIOM, FOM, and the Levada Center are compared with IEA and Reuters assessments of the state of Russia’s oil-refining industry, several important patterns emerge.

First, the Russian economy is increasingly feeling the consequences of strikes on energy infrastructure. This is confirmed not only by reports of fires but also by estimates of oil-processing volumes and disruptions to industrial operations.

Second, public sentiment does not indicate an unequivocal shift toward an anti-war position, but there are noticeable signs of fatigue and reluctance to see further escalation. The 65% in favor of negotiations and the 57% who fear mobilization are particularly telling.

Third, despite Putin’s high formal approval ratings, short-term fluctuations in trust are emerging. These should be monitored over time rather than taken out of context.

Fourth, the Kremlin’s control over information does not eliminate the actual consequences of the war. It can influence how they are perceived, but it cannot completely conceal problems that people see around them.

At the same time, further research is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn about a causal link between Ukrainian strikes and changes in Putin’s approval ratings. This would require regional polling, comparisons of public sentiment in the hardest-hit and more remote regions, and long-term monitoring of trust indicators.

For now, it is premature to speak of a political collapse in Russia. But it is already possible to speak of an accumulation of factors that are making the war increasingly uncomfortable for Russia’s rear areas.

And perhaps this is one of the most important strategic consequences of Ukrainian strikes: the war that the Kremlin tried to keep away from Russians’ everyday lives is gradually returning to them in the form of economic problems, danger, and the need to answer for the decisions made by their own government.