Just a few years ago, the ability to strike Russia’s rear at a depth of 80–100 kilometers on a mass scale was considered the next major technological frontier.

This is where the routes carrying ammunition, fuel, equipment, and reserves to the front run, while command posts, air defence systems and electronic warfare systems are also located. Reaching such targets with an expensive drone is one thing. Making the enemy no longer feel safe there is an entirely different matter.

In 2026, that threshold was effectively crossed.

Cheaper and more numerous long-range UAVs have made it possible to move from pinpoint strikes against individual high-priority targets to systematic operations at operational depth. What is now known as middle strike has grown over several years from a niche capability of individual technology-focused units into a full-fledged tool for operating against Russia’s rear.

One of the units that has gone through this evolution from the very beginning is the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

Its history began in autumn 2022 with an experimental unmanned aerial systems battalion. Even then, its crews were operating against the Russian rear at distances that were unusual for that time. In 2023, the unit grew into the 14th Separate Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment and later into the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Centre.

Serafym Hordiienko, call sign “Falco,” is directly involved in planning middle strike operations at the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Centre.

In an interview with an ArmyInform correspondent, he explained how this area has changed over the past six months, why a technological solution on the battlefield may remain relevant for only around six months, what is happening to Russian air defences, and how the 1st Separate Centre paralysed operations at Donetsk Airport.

Photo by the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center of the USF

120 kilometers remain. The scale does not

“Falco” had previously defined his operational-tactical working depth as approximately 120 kilometers from the line of contact. He does not give a new figure now.

— Let’s leave it at that — around 120 kilometres.

Over the past six months, it is not so much the range that has changed as the scale of operations at this depth.

In spring 2026, middle-strike operations began to scale up rapidly. In March, the Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out nearly 350 strikes at a depth of 30–120 kilometers, and at the end of April this area was officially identified as one of the priorities. By that point, the state had already contracted five times more of these systems than during the entire previous year. In May, the “Logistics Lockdown” campaign was launched, and an additional UAH 5 billion was allocated to units to purchase middle strike systems.

“Falco” sums it up more briefly:

— 2026 has become the year of targeting logistics.

According to him, the turning point was not the emergence of any single new UAV model. What changed above all was the economics of their use.

— Previously, systems capable of operating at such distances were concentrated in a small number of specialised units. Because of their cost, they were used selectively — against SAM systems, electronic warfare systems and other high-value targets. The emergence of cheap “Starlink flyers” changed both the market and tactics: they can be produced on a mass scale, and mass deployment makes it possible to systematically target the enemy’s infrastructure at the operational level.

In the military, “Starlink flyers” refers to drones equipped with a satellite communications link via Starlink. This allows them to maintain communication with the aircraft far beyond the capabilities of a conventional direct radio link.

Mass deployment has also changed the overall effect of such operations.

— Systematic strikes against the enemy’s infrastructure directly affect its ability to conduct operational manoeuvre. As a result, the enemy simply conducts fewer offensive operations.

At the same time, the satellite communications link has become a new point of confrontation.

In June, soldiers from the 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment and the “A” Special Operations Centre of the Security Service of Ukraine detected and destroyed a Russian system that the enemy was using to jam Starlink and disrupt the operation of Ukrainian middle strike systems.

“Falco” confirms that the Russians are testing such solutions, but they have not yet become a widespread problem.

— They have tried to introduce systems for jamming Starlink, but this has not yet become widespread. So the situation has not changed significantly.

However, the current advantage does not mean that it will remain that way for long.

Serafym Hordiienko, call sign “Falco”

“We cannot rest on our laurels”

“Falco” dates the current technological window of opportunity to approximately April 2026.

Among the units that have made particularly active use of it, he mentions the drone operators of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Azov” and KRAKEN within the 3rd Army Corps.

The 1st Corps reported establishing fire control over the Mariupol–Taganrog and Mariupol–Volnovakha routes, which are key supply routes for Russian forces in the Sea of Azov region. The corps itself said that the “sanitary zone” for Russian logistics had been pushed closer to the Russian border and occupied Crimea.

In Luhansk region, KRAKEN operators, meanwhile, targeted trucks, fuel tankers and rear bases of the enemy.

— Ukraine has made very good use of 2026. The initiative is still on our side. I think that in the history of this war, this will still be seen as a significant technological breakthrough. But we need to understand that this is a temporary success. We cannot rest on our laurels in modern warfare. The Russians are definitely working on a response, so we need to be looking ahead already.

“Looking ahead” means next spring.

In autumn and winter, fixed-wing UAVs have fewer suitable weather windows. For “Falco,” this is a period of restructuring and preparation for the new season.

— Approximately every year, mid-autumn and winter are periods when flying weather is often unsuitable for both us and the Russians. This is a time for infrastructure projects, modifying systems and preparing for spring.

This does not mean that we will create some special “winter” drone and somehow overcome physics. There is low cloud cover and there are weather conditions under which a particular type of system simply does not operate properly.

So the methods of employment change, infrastructure develops, and the systems themselves are modified. And if you look at previous cycles, the main breakthrough solutions very often emerge in spring.

Spring 2027: It may not be just the technology that changes

By next spring, the geography of the fighting itself may also change.

After the completion of the work of the “East” Operational Grouping in Donetsk region, two new military command structures emerged — the “Center” Operational Grouping and the “Azov” Operational Grouping, headed by Andrii Biletskyi and Denys Prokopenko.

“Falco” sees this restructuring as a possible indication of where a significant part of the fighting may be concentrated in the near future.

— I think the theatre of operations may shift somewhat geographically. The formation of two groupings of forces — the “Center” Operational Grouping and the “Azov” Operational Grouping — underlines that this area may become one of the main theatres of operations in the near future.

In the same area, the 3rd Army Corps has already demonstrated how far systematic work against the rear can go.

During Operation “Vivaldi”, the corps initially isolated a strip up to 50 kilometres from the front with drones and then expanded it to 120 kilometres. Strikes on warehouses, fuel and transport forced the support units of Russia’s 144th Motor Rifle Division to withdraw to Voronezh region, while the equipment evacuation route increased by approximately 250 kilometres.

But “Falco” warns against another extreme — treating the current advantage as something permanent. The Russians know how to play the long game, and they are willing to do so.

— We have been successfully operating systems of this type for quite a long time now. The Russians are one hundred per cent working on countermeasures; we simply do not yet know what their next solutions will be. Approximately every six months, the same thing happens: something new appears, and another game of “cat and mouse” begins — who will outsmart whom. This is a normal process.

Approximately six months — that is how “Falco” assesses the life cycle of a technological solution on the battlefield.

Photo by the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center of the USF

From Buk systems to mobile fire teams

One of the clearest examples of such a cycle is Russian air defence.

In 2026, countering it has already turned into a separate systematic campaign. During 261 days of the Unmanned Systems Forces’ “PPOpad-2026” operation, 300 air defence, radar and electronic warfare systems were confirmed hit, including 162 SAM and anti-aircraft missile-gun systems, 124 radar systems and 14 electronic warfare systems.

At the same time, targeting air defence is needed not only for the sake of destroying the system itself.

In September, operators from the “Achilles” Brigade struck a Russian Nebo-M radar 175 kilometres from the line of contact. The system is designed for the early detection of airborne targets. Brigade Commander Yurii Fedorenko explained the logic simply: the fewer such radars protecting Russian airfields, the more Ukrainian systems have a chance of reaching their targets.

The Russians’ ability to replace conventional SAM systems has not disappeared, however.

— They can still compensate for such losses. If, say, a Buk or Tor is destroyed, another one will appear after some time. But if we are talking specifically about countering middle strike, this is no longer such a major problem. I would not call it critical.

Instead, the structure of the defence itself has changed.

— We need to distinguish between conventional surface-to-air missile systems and mobile fire teams. We also work against mobile teams. They have their own specifics and require very painstaking work.

Such teams can be deployed very densely along key Russian routes. Mykhailo Trach, commander of the “Sapsans” Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 30th Brigade, said that on some sections, shooters are positioned almost every 100–200 metres along the road.

Back in summer, “Falco” explained that finding and destroying a large Buk, Tor or Pantsir system can sometimes be easier than locating a small crew operating drone interceptors. To support their operations, the Russians deploy a network of compact radars, some of which, he compared in size, are roughly the same as a Starlink terminal.

In other words, Russian air defence has not disappeared. It has become smaller, more dispersed and harder to locate.

R&D — the “professional etiquette” of a technology-focused unit

With such a pace of change, the time between a new problem emerging on the battlefield and a ready response to it becomes critical.

“Falco” says that the Ukrainian market is increasingly closing the development cycle within the country: a system reaches the battlefield, the operator provides technical feedback, and the manufacturer can quickly improve it.

In technology-focused units, some of this process is handled by their own R&D teams. R&D stands for Research and Development — the research, development and technical refinement of solutions.

— Having R&D in a unit of this type is not a nice bonus but a mandatory rule. A great many developments require initial research and feedback from the end user. Only after that can the manufacturer be given a clear understanding of what needs to be changed or modified more substantially.

It is much easier for a manufacturer to work with a unit that can speak to it in the same technical language. For me, R&D has always been one of the key factors determining success or failure.

The same logic is gradually being adopted in procurement. In June, the state launched its first competitive tender for middle strike UAVs, in which systems are selected not by a specific model name but by their tactical and technical characteristics.

At the 1st Separate Center, part of the initial development cycle is handled internally.

— I will not disclose a detailed list of our capabilities. But we cover the entire initial cycle required by a unit of this type. I would even say that having R&D is already a kind of professional etiquette.

“This field is a very small world”: How the 1st Separate Center paralyzed Donetsk Airport

But a technical solution is only part of an operation. Intelligence, planning and cooperation between different units and agencies are then required.

— It can be anything from exchanging intelligence to the direct joint participation of people from different agencies in a single operation. This field is a very small world; everyone more or less knows everyone else. In my experience, there is no interagency competition. If we need to work together, we will work together.

For example, the April strike on the command post of Russia’s FSB special forces in Donetsk was prepared by the Deep Strike Centre of the Unmanned Systems Forces together with the National Guard’s 1st Corps “Azov”, while the strike itself was carried out by the 1st Separate Centre.

“Falco” describes the operation on the territory of Donetsk Airport as the most illustrative example carried out by his own unit.

After the occupation, Russian forces turned Donetsk Airport into an important hub of their military infrastructure and a launch base for Shaheds and other attack UAVs targeting Ukraine. The airport housed launchers, logistics hubs, vehicles, fuel tankers, warehouses and engineering equipment. In effect, an entire infrastructure was operating there to support the preparation and execution of strikes against Ukrainian cities.

Therefore, the task of the 1st Separate Center was not to destroy several individual launchers, but to make the operation of the entire site impossible.

— We completely paralysed the airport’s operations, and this affected the overall coordination of launches against Ukraine. The individual targets hit were only one component. We deliberately made this operation public because, to a certain extent, it is a model operation for us.

“Falco” informally calls this approach middle strike light.

— Overall, it is simply middle strike. But we wanted to publicly show what such work can look like. One of the basic principles is continuity of employment: to operate constantly and in such a way that the enemy cannot keep up with everything.

Including preparation, the operation lasted about three weeks.

— It was not very different from our daily work. The only difference was that this time it was focused on achieving a specific effect. The task of the headquarters is precisely to build the operation in such a way that people can maintain this pace for a long time.

“The machine has already won”

Donetsk Airport, “Starlink flyers,” interceptors, R&D teams — for “Falco,” all of these are parts of the same reality in which technology has already moved to the forefront.

— We are now living in such a futuristic world where the machine has already won. And this war, to some extent, has become the crown on the head of this king of technology. And new “jewels” are constantly appearing in this crown — new technologies, solutions and ways of countering them.

Therefore, for “Falco,” the main task is not to guess what the next major invention will be, but not to surrender the initiative in this race to the enemy.

— We are using our youth, talent and abilities to ensure that Ukraine always maintains the initiative.

The officer does not disclose details of what exactly the 1st Separate Center is preparing next.

— Watch our next videos and you will see what tasks the 1st Separate Centre is setting for itself. Something is always happening here. We will reveal more over time.